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20 May 1963

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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Yugoslavia: Tito's 18 May foreign policy speech to his central committee apparently was intended to advance Yugoslavia as a participant, rather than a mere object, in the Sino-Soviet dialogue.

By representing Khrushchev's views as enlightened and giving them his support, Tito probably was also attempting to keep Moscow from reaching any compromise with the Chinese at Yugoslav expense.

The Yugoslav leader claimed that he was trying to dispel apathy within his own party toward international Communist affairs and, by implication, that he was defending his policy of rapprochement with Moscow against Yugoslav critics.

Tito indicated no changes in his country's foreign policy; he described it as nonaligned and expressed a desire for the best possible relations with the West.

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Poland: (Indecision and uncertainty at top levels of the regime have led to a diminution in Polish party leader Gomulka's stature among the party and the populace.)

(Gomulka's leadership has not been openly challenged, but there is evidence that his "middle course" is under attack from many sides. [redacted])

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[redacted] all levels of the party are demoralized by his unwillingness or inability to deal with the situation. Top party echelons reportedly are aware of this but have been ineffective in combating it because of the party's general weakness and the administrative confusion caused by political infighting.)

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(Gomulka has sought to avoid an intraparty showdown which would further alarm the population. At the present time the people are angry and sullen over the prolonged stagnation in the standard of living and the realization that there is little hope for improvement this year. Tensions are growing, especially in urban areas, where workers, students, and intellectuals reportedly are expressing more openly than in years their dissatisfaction with the Communist regime and those whom they consider its crassly incompetent leaders. [redacted])

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DAILY BRIEF

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Communist China - Indonesia: Peiping apparently does not intend at this time to intervene with the Indonesian Government over the recent series of anti-Chinese disturbances in western Java.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In its first reference to the subject, the official Chinese Communist news agency stressed the efforts of Indonesian authorities to curb the outbreaks, and alleged that Indonesian public opinion was strongly against the perpetrators of the outrages.

Heavy-handed intervention in 1959 and 1960 on behalf of Overseas Chinese allegedly being mistreated by the Indonesians severely damaged Chinese Communist relations with Djakarta. Peiping has subsequently devoted considerable effort to repairing that damage. This was capped by the April visit to Indonesia of Liu Shao-chi, the first visit by a Chinese Communist chief of state to a nonbloc nation. [REDACTED]

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NOTES

Communist China: A Komar-class guided-mis-
sile patrol boat, the first observed in Communist
China, has been tentatively identified [redacted]

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[redacted] Komars are a modification of
the P-6 motor torpedo boat. It cannot be determined
whether the [redacted] craft was modified by the
Chinese or delivered by the USSR. The Chinese have
produced about 50-80 P-6 patrol boats. [redacted]

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